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Current research continues to advance the concept of Central European paramilitary violence, which it sees as a product of a complex culture of defeat.
14 At the same time, the cultural and psychological determinants of physical violence have garnered some scholarly attention over the last couple of years. The ways in which the protagonists viewed and legitimized their own violent practices and the cultural framework that dynamized those practices in specific situations have become the focus of scholarly research. 15 This research, however, is generally devoted to the Central European states that were on the losing side of the First World War. Thus, for example, when Robert Gerwarth reviews the situation in Central Europe shortly after 1918 he concludes that a right-wing wave of political violence swept through both Austria and Hungary -the biggest successor states of the Habsburg Empire. 16 While Austria and Hungary were the successor states of the Habsburg Empire that were deemed to have lost the war, they were certainly far from being the biggest in terms of size or population. The Czechoslovak Republic as well as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (officially becoming Yugoslavia in 1929) stretched over a bigger territory and each had almost the same number of inhabitants as Austria and Hungary combined. 17 The relevant scholarship has thus largely missed the other side of the fall and reconstruction of Central
Europe at the turn of 1910s and 20s, originating not from a "culture of defeat," but rather from an opposite "culture of victory." 18 The end of the First World War meant not only the emergence of states, which were identified and identified themselves as defeated, but also the creation of states whose public spaces were overcome by euphoria from victory and their newly-won state independence after 1918. In states such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or Romania, symbolic dates in the fall of 1918 were celebrated as national holidays. Allied representatives were invited to official celebrations, the armies of these states cooperated with
Italian or French general staffs and the war was seen as an event that accelerated the emergence of a new, or strengthened an already existing, independent nation state. 19 If the war cemented the nation as the main framework of thought for many men deployed at the front, its outcome and end were integrated even more into complex national narratives, coining the concept of "national revolution" as the main result of the destructive, but liberating, war. 20 But, as this study will show, even within cultures of victory uniformed physical violence was hardly absent as a constitutive dimension of the post-war order. Securing the new borders in the context of ethnically and religiously heterogeneous societies generated significant tensions and violent excesses even in places where nationalist movements were connected rather to non-violent traditions, such as Ireland, Poland and Czechoslovakia. 21 Czechoslovakia and Austria are both very well suited for comparison. The Czech lands, as the core of the new Czechoslovak state, and Austria shared the very same state until 1918. 22 They were both the most industrial parts of the Habsburg Monarchy and, as such,
were marked by a similar social structure with a strong working class and a long pre-war tradition of institutionalized parliamentary politics and an organized political left and right. 23 Even though they parted ways after the war, they were still confronted with similar problems in the establishment of a new, post-war order.
While Czechoslovakia had become already during the interwar period a widely praised symbol of democratic stability with a functioning civil society and effective mediation of social or national conflicts for many, especially English-speaking external observers, we must not forget that these were rather the outcome of tumultuous post-war years than established right after the end of the war. 24 Although former parliamentary rule and government was reestablished in Czechoslovakia quite quickly, the young republic was, in the immediate years after the war, far from a stable parliamentary democracy. The securing of the borderlands in the West and completely new territories in the East in 1918-19 resulted in armed clashes with the German-speaking population and eventually into two wars with Poland and Hungary. 25 Right after the international securing of the new state during 1919, the conflict between the political left and right generated a political instability that brought the young republic to the 6 brink of civil war in 1920. Both of these tensions generated significant pressure on parliamentary politics throughout the early 1920s. As even some of the local authors that were traditionally positive towards interwar Czechoslovakia noted recently, at least until 1922
Czechoslovakia resembled more a "Czech national dictatorship" rather than a flourishing parliamentary, democratic state. 26 Austria faced a number of similar challenges right after the war. Keeping the food ration system until November 1922 (Czechoslovakia until July 1921), the young republic struggled with severe material supply problems that further dynamized the already burning social conflict. 27 Reestablishing the national parliament and a legitimate government as quickly as Czechoslovakia, Austria was nevertheless consumed by the clash between the radicalized left and right between 1918 and 1922, which also brought the young republic to the brink of collapse and internal armed conflict. Similarly to Czechoslovakia, the territorial losses that Austria suffered as a result of the Paris peace treaties sparked regional armed conflicts with some of its neighboring states, albeit much more localized and less intense than in the Czechoslovak case. 28 As a result of these external and internal pressures, both states were far from free from the physical violence that was used during the early post-war years as a means of achieving political goals. However, the different position of these two states within the emerging new European order framed these similar experiences and challenges differently. 29 While
Czechoslovakia's public space was shaped by an overwhelming "culture of victory" after the war, Austria was dominated by a contrastive "culture of defeat." The main question at stake is thus if, and how, did these contrasting cultures affect the operation and perception of uniformed violence in both societies and how, in turn, did uniformed violence shape these cultures. The comparison is thus fruitful for both cases. It seeks to shed new light on the argument about the importance of the "culture of defeat" for explaining the occurrence of violence in some of the post-war societies. On the other hand, it also tries to show the 7 surprising potential that one of the most model "cultures of victory" had in appropriating physical violence to stabilize itself.
In order to ground the comparison empirically, the paper will first concentrate on the different levels of weapons proliferation as one of the most visible practical features distinguishing the culture of victory from that of defeat. It will argue that the ever-present feeling of victory among the Czech-speaking population of the newly created Czechoslovak state made it possible to limit the proliferation of various weapons and thereby quickly recapture the state's monopoly on violence. In Austria, by contrast, the feeling of unjust defeat had weakened the state to such an extent that it effectively ceased to control the proliferation of weapons. This then enabled the emergence of a paramilitary culture, which shaped the public space of the new Austrian republic and deepened the feeling of collapse and defeat.
However, even though Czechoslovakia comparatively quickly reclaimed the monopoly on violence, it did not bring about the disappearance of uniformed violence as a part of everyday life. In the next part, the paper will therefore concentrate on the violence committed by the officers and soldiers of the newly created Czechoslovak army. Using the example of the reclaiming of the Czechoslovak borderlands in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus´ in particular, the paper will demonstrate that even the Czechoslovak culture of victory was able to incorporate uniformed physical violence into the set of practices that were used to shape the new order. I will then conclude with some comparative remarks on the role that uniformed violence played in shaping the post-war order in the different social, ethnic and discursive environments in Austria and Czechoslovakia.
Guns in Public. Reclaiming the State's Monopoly on Violence
As the above-mentioned incident in Olomouc illuminates, the immediate post-war years cannot be considered years of peaceful, non-violent reconstruction and state-building were entrusted with the protection of the working class or the rural population against real or imagined class enemies. These were quickly divided into units that dominated the public space of numerous Austrian towns and villages, contributing heavily to a general feeling of foreboding of the approaching civil war that further dynamized the particular camps' need to arm themselves. 38 In November 1920, for example, Austrian police reported that more than one thousand workers armed with guns and machine guns and led by the former noncommissioned Austrian officer Richard Tässl were patrolling the region around Wiener Neustadt, on the lookout for alleged rural militias. According to the police, it was certain that "…every worker in this region has at least one gun at home." 39 Only two weeks later, a tense stand-off between workers' and peasants' militias was reported in the village of Gramatneusiedl, south-east of Vienna, where "...the Social Democratic as well as ChristianSocial populations are heavily armed with weapons that come from the war returnees." 40 In
Innsbruck on May 23, 1921 the provincial government had to deal with dozens of heavily armed former imperial officers, who appeared in their old military uniforms at the public festivities for Corpus Christi and tried to turn the religious gathering into a monarchic manifestation. 41 As these examples show, a huge number of weapons that disappeared from military warehouses during the last months of the war suddenly appeared in the hands of armed civilians. In the village of Pottendorf near Vienna, the Social Democratic Volkswehr distributed dozens of guns to local workers every day during the winter of 1920. 42 In the summer of 1921, Vienna police accidentally discovered five machine guns and 2500 pieces of ammunition at the apartment of university student Franz Nowotny and as late as March 1922 a police raid in one of the houses in Linz found several barrels filled with poisonous gas belonging to the local nationalist "Selbstschutzverbund," which was prepared to use it against potential Social Democratic or Communist attackers. 43 In the small town of Wöllersdorf near
Wiener Neustadt, hundreds of grenades that had disappeared at the end of the war on their way to Lemberg were found in the hands of the armed Social Democratic Volkswehr that was passing them on to friendly civilians. 44 The wide distribution not only of firearms, but also of military gases, grenades and other heavy weapons among the common population illustrates the level to which the state's monopoly on violence declined in the first post-war years in Austria. In the summer of 1921, Austrian police officially admitted that they had to cease upholding the respective law that officially forbade civilians from carrying firearms. It declared a wide reaching amnesty for all illegal gun holders, provided that they hand over their guns voluntarily. In only three months, between June and August 1921, in Vienna alone over 1500 guns and 70 000 pieces of ammunition were handed over to authorities. However, these numbers were perceived as a profound failure, given the tens of thousands of guns that the Austrian authorities still believed were illegally dispersed throughout the country. 45 The level of uncertainty about the future, the profound feeling of utter defeat and the broad proliferation of weapons among the general population prevented the Austrian state from monopolizing the violence and enabled armed paramilitary units to seize the public space. Austrian towns and villages became a showplace for demonstrations of organized paramilitary power. In September 1920, for example, more than 300 men were observed performing military exercises under the command of former imperial officers in the outer Vienna district of Simmering. According to the district governor, they were workers from the nearby factories, who had prepared themselves for clashes with the conservative Heimwehr. 46 Almost exactly one year later, the 15 th Vienna district witnessed a joint exercise of over 600 hundred armed workers, who even performed an ostentatious march through the traditional working-class neighborhood of Ottakring. 47 In both cases, as well as in many others, the official state police lacked the capacity to intervene and could merely passively witness the further disintegration of state authority.
With such a high level of militarization, gun violence became an almost everyday experience of public life. On May 8, 1921 , for example, a Christian social meeting in the village of Sankt Lorenz near Salzburg was attacked by armed workers who focused primarily on the main organizers -the local landholder Peter Papst and the county representative Dr.
Rintelen. As eyewitnesses testified: "One of the attackers grabbed a ladder bag from the table and hit the speaker on the head. Others were beating Papst so that he fell on the floor.
Rintelen was thrown against the window and beaten with sticks and stones. When defending himself he had to pull out his gun." 48 What is telling about this is not so much the attack on Dr. Rintelen itself, but rather the fact that in Austria in 1921 it was still quite normal even for a lower provincial official to carry and use a firearm.
While carrying and potentially using guns in the context of the collapsed state was a common experience if not a necessity for many ordinary Austrians, Czechoslovakia was in this respect a much safer place. The shared feeling of victory from the fall of 1918 made it possible for the newly emerging state authorities to capture the monopoly on violence quite quickly. 49 Already in October and November 1918 public manifestations were held where people were either ostensibly relinquishing the weapons they had at home in favor of the newly emerging republican army or even enlisted themselves in this army as volunteers. 50 While the German or Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of the new Czechoslovak state were prevented from joining the army until the fall of 1919, 51 from the declaration of Czechoslovak independence on October 28 until the end of 1918 a total of 18 Czech-speaking volunteer battalions were formed all over the Czech lands with the estimated strength of more than 10 thousand soldiers. 52 The feeling of victory gave rise to an enthusiasm that saw weapons as belonging to an army that was the best defender of the newly won national independence. conservative Czechoslovak soldiers, the imagined or real Bolshevik enemy played a similar role as in Austria, except that the hatred of the "panslavic mess" was substituted by the inverted fight against "pangermanism." 56 As a result, violent clashes between former frontline soldiers were common in Czechoslovakia and Austria alike, as were clashes between uniformed soldiers or paramilitaries and the civilian population.
In the summer of 1920, for example, a quarrel between Czech-speaking legionnaires and former imperial soldiers in the mostly German-speaking town of Jihlava (Iglau) 57 turned into a skirmish, claiming the lives of two participating soldiers. Symptomatically, shortly after the incident the German population of the town was held responsible and dozens of legionnaires occupied the town against the will of the official bodies. In the following days, they fired workers from their jobs and conducted wild and violent house searches. Both sides committed mass executions of POWs, and occasionally ritually mutilated their bodies. Cases of corpses, whose face was disfigured to such an extent that the body was almost impossible to identify, were no exception. 63 Brutal cases of mass public executions, programmatically wanted the bodies to be discovered. These killings formed very deep bonds between soldiers because they automatically placed them at risk of brutal revenge. Extreme violence was thus a moment that created an internally coherent male community of perpetrators. Disfiguring a dead body, or massacring defenseless civilians, including women and juveniles, established an internally coherent collective of perpetrators, for the experience of such mutilated bodies and fear of enemy reprisals prevailed over any internal differences among them. 65 When the Czechoslovak legionnaires were transferred back into Central Europe during 1918-1920, the basic structure of the units was maintained and collectives forged during the campaigns abroad were not separated. The Czechoslovak government opted to keep the experienced military units intact, as these were practically the only armed forces it could rely on. 66 Thus the military power of the state was effectively boosted, but on the other hand the legionnaire communities represented a significant potential for unleashing unprecedented violence.
In the imagination of nationally conservative soldiers, the newly created Czechoslovak state was not only threatened by communism, but also by ever-present German or Hungarian counter-revolution. According to many, the national revolution had to be completed through the total sidelining of the non-Czech speaking population of the new state. Ethnic violence committed by uniformed legionnaires became an everyday occurrence all over Czechoslovakia and its targets were manifold. In May 1919, for example, legionnaires were overseeing public lootings of Jewish and German property in the streets of Prague and ensuring that every looter got his or her share, while at the same time preventing the shop owners from doing anything about the ransacking crowd. 67 One of the Prague shoe shop owners bitterly complained to the local police that on May 23 1919, a crowd gathered in front of his shop and demanded that his shoes be sold at forced low prices. The present uniformed soldiers did not do anything to stop this, precisely the opposite. Threatening him with their guns, they even forced him to sell his goods for the enforced prices. 68 In January 1920, a crowd of uniformed legionnaires stormed the Prague apartment of a Galician Jewish family, and moved the furniture out to enable another legionnaire to move in. Their actions were approved by many people in line at a nearby supply office. 69 In October 1920, a legionnaire asked the janitor of a Prague apartment house to open an apartment for him, bolstering his authority with the reference to his uniform and thereby his military status. He then emptied two rooms in the apartment to free it for his friends. 70 These incidents point to a specific idea of justice or even moral economy that was cultivated both among the deprived public and among the uniformed legionnaires. In the context of the Czechoslovak culture of victory, this idea merged with the ethnic divisions within Czechoslovak society and enabled the soldiers to deploy physical violence as a means to deepen the perception of victory and the resulting revenge on alleged German or Jewish wartime profiteers and enemies of the national revolution.
However, such violence did not have to be connected with material interests at all. In November 1920, for example, the English-speaking pregnant wife of a British embassy employee was attacked on the streets of Prague by legionnaires because they simply thought she was speaking German in public. 71 More or less serious attempts to undermine the emerging republican order were also gaining momentum. In July 1919, a battalion of legionnaires revolted in southern Bohemia, imprisoned its officers and marched on Plzeň (Pilsen) where they hoped to get reinforcements for a further march on Prague to storm government buildings. 72 In November 1920, in reaction to the alleged destruction of a Czech school in the predominantly German town of Cheb (Eger), the former Russian legionnaire Josef Zápotocký assembled a crowd in the center of Prague and planned to attack the Czechoslovak Parliament. According to him, Czechoslovak state power was not able to deal with the increasing provocations of the German population in the borderlands and therefore it was necessary to violently suspend the parliamentary form of government and to deal with the "pangermanic" counter-revolution with violent means. 73 The dynamics of the ethnic conflict unfolding in Czechoslovakia at the break of the properties were ransacked and Jews thrown out of their houses and humiliated. 78 Catholic priests were taken away in the middle of holding mass and publicly beaten. In a village near the Sucarpathian administrative center of Užhorod (Ungwar), for example, a Catholic priest was violently dragged out of his home, bound to a carriage, publicly beaten and showed off to the local inhabitants on the streets. After torturing him for several hours, Czechoslovak soldiers stabbed him to death with bayonets, letting the local crowd witness the brutal theater until the very end. 79 The retributions in Slovakia even claimed the lives of several women, girls and juvenile boys who were shot on the streets. 80 On June 3, 1919, 28-year-old Jozef Tepper and 14-year-old Vojtech Tirpak were, as alleged Hungarian spies, executed on the street of the eastern Slovak town of Košice (Kaschau). As one of the overseeing Czechoslovak officers reported: "Jozef Tepper was kneeling by the wall and kept shouting that he was innocent.
Vojtěch Tirpák collapsed and was lying on the ground. His mother begged the officer on her knees for her boy's life. He sent her to the command and said they would wait. The moment the mother left, shots rang out. Civilians present during the execution were dispersed." 81 The 21 number of such incidents is still unknown, but judging from the reactions to them they were hardly a negligible episode. In 1919, the scope of violent actions perpetrated by Czechoslovak soldiers deployed in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus´ was so alarming that it eventually forced some of the higher ranked officers to forbid the soldiers from having any contact with the local population 82 and even provoked British and French diplomatic interventions. 83 As these examples show, many executions were far from a strictly organized military practice. The main inspector of the Czechoslovak armed forces, Josef Svatopluk Machar, later recalled that officers on the spot were postponing the execution of Tepper and Tirpák, which should have been carried out during the night. The reason for this was a drinking party with local civil officials who, together with the military officers, wanted to make the execution a public event and at the same time were hesitant to stop drinking during the night. 84 As a result, the execution was staged in such a way as to attract not just the attention of the Czechoslovak officials and military officers, but also of the local crowd. 85 This kind of public display was a common denominator of the uniformed violence perpetrated in eastern Czechoslovakia. Many of the executions and killings in the contested regions of Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus´ were carried out by the military publicly and on the streets. In many cases, executed bodies were not buried, but left lying on the streets for the local community to take care of. Killings committed by knives, bayonets or rifle butts were as common as executions committed by guns.
It was precisely this form of violence that made the real difference. In Austria, the majority of victims were found in Vienna and other larger cities and the casualties were As one Czech war veteran remembered: "We chased the Russians from their posts.
The order was: no pardons, no prisoners. I can't understand the Russians. Men tall as mountains; they could kill us with their bare hands. They stopped, raised their hands and looked at us like children, so kindheartedly, as if they were our people and were waiting for us. And we pounced on them like beasts. We used bayonets and knives. We sliced their necks as if they were goslings." 88 Similarly brutal killings of POWs and civilians belonged to the repertoire of many units on the Russian front, and later in the civil war, and it is therefore not surprising that they belonged to the basic repertoire of the Czechoslovak legions as well.
As current military research confirms, killings with a stabbing weapon at a distance of no more that an arm's length has the greatest potential to generate psychological trauma. The immediate experience of the enemy's death, "the intimate brutality" of the opportunity to experience his last breath, in many cases breaks down ethical boundaries and creates future soldiers, who in subsequent battles lack any sort of moral limits to killing. 89 
23
Thus, when these male collectives returned home and were sent to the eastern periphery, they were reanimating the mode they were used to from the Russian Civil War. As a result, they did not comply with the official commands given from Prague, but applied their The whole conflict also never transgressed into larger excesses against the civilian population. The overall number of civilian casualties did not exceed a few dozens, and the majority died from accidental shootings. 100 The distinguishing line between combatants and non-combatants was never blurred to such an extent as in the case of the eastern Czechoslovak borderlands. Similarly to the Czech-German clash in the west of Czechoslovakia in late 1918 and early 1919, the conflict between Austrian-Germans and Slovenes in lower Styria was rooted in long-lasting pre-war rivalries. 101 The immediate postwar years experienced an escalation of this conflict, throwing the region into a short-term war with several hundred casualties. However, this conflict was played out as a clash between two more or less distinct adversaries over clearly defined territorial claims. The soldiers also did not experience deployment in the Russian Civil War and a victorious feeling from the newly won state independence, which would encourage violent acts against mistrusted civilians.
Thus, basic norms of war, such as those differentiating between soldiers and civilians, were not broken and brutal violence that went beyond the customs of a regular war was practically non-existent.
Conclusions
We can conclude that as far as uniformed violence in the immediate postwar years is concerned, Austria and Czechoslovakia share many similarities. Both the culture of defeat and the culture of victory generated and propelled various forms of uniformed violence, which became part of everyday politics. In Austria, conservative paramilitaries saw Jews and
Bolsheviks as the main culprits of the post-war chaos. In Czechoslovak soldiers' fantasies, Jews and Bolsheviks represented one of the last obstacles in fulfilling the national republican dream. The mobilizing force of the fear of "panslavism" in Austria found its counterpart in the specter of "pangermanism" in Czechoslovakia. Physical attacks on imagined or real
Communists were similarly fierce and ruthless in both countries. In Czechoslovakia, these were supplemented by similarly fierce attacks on real or imagined Germans or Hungarians.
However, uniformed violence in both countries also differed in many ways. The first obvious difference is the institutional framework. Victorious Czechoslovakia could accommodate many of the returning soldiers into its newly emerging army, thus giving them an institutionalized opportunity to refuse demobilization and to operate within the state monopoly on violence. In Austria, the majority of the violence was not perpetrated within the state monopoly, but was committed by paramilitary forces organized around political camps. In Czechoslovakia, the culture of victory generated a more stable environment. During the uneasy "founding years," the Czechoslovak state power never collapsed to such an extent as in Austria and after securing the new state internally and externally a stable parliamentary democracy unfolded, where the potential to resort to violence for political means was comparably low. Even though Czechoslovakia had to face, above all, the ethnic challenge, its political system never imploded, as in the case of Austria, but eventually had to be destroyed from the outside.
